There remains, however, a lack of consensus concerning the definition of Homeland Defense, its component elements, and the specific threats that should be subsumed under this concept. Given that the definition of Homeland Defense will impact associated roles, missions, and operational concepts not only of the U.S. Armed Forces, but also of a wide variety of U.S. agencies with responsibilities in the national security area, it is imperative to clarify the terms of reference. Further, to the extent that U.S.
armed forces are tasked with a Homeland Defense mission, it should be acknowledged from the outset that there will be significant opportunity costs as limited resources, both budgetary and intellectual, are applied in this area rather than to other missions and priority initiatives.
In this paper the term Homeland Defense (as opposed to alternative formulations such Homeland Security) will be used with the understanding that no a priori assumptions are being made about the use of the military instrument. In fact, it will be argued here that DOD and the U.S. armed forces should only play the lead role in those elements of a Homeland Defense strategy that are well-established as being within the proper domain of the armed forces and where the military instrument can be reasonably expected to make a unique contribution to the achievement of the desired objective. This argument is not based on a strict interpretation of the legal principle of Posse Comitatus, but rather on the belief that U.S. aims can be accomplished most effectively by a coordinated application of the full range of instruments available to policymakers, and that a holistic approach will allow for the integration of diplomatic, law enforcement, and civil libertarian considerations that must be incorporated into a successful approach to the perceived threats. Given the understandable inclination to view the military as a source of ready and effective resources, such an approach will require restraint on the part of policymakers.
A comprehensive and effective Homeland Defense strategy will require a joint approach in the broadest sense of that term: inter-service, interagency, and in conjunction with a range of domestic and international partners. The authors of the CSIS study, "Homeland Defense; A Strategic Approach", have noted that, given the diversity of the threats involved, it would be difficult at best to arrive at a "unified theory of homeland defense". 1 However, as the CSIS report also concluded that, "The U.S. must view homeland defense as a partnership among federal, state, local, and private sector organizations and must fit into U.S. systems of law and concept of federalism." 2 Development of a Homeland Defense strategy will also have to move beyond discussion of issues related to consequence management and incorporate the concepts of deterrence, prevention, disruption, attribution, and retaliation.
Threats to the Homeland
Bringing clarity to the discussion of Homeland Defense requires focus on the objectives to be achieved, an understanding of the specific threats to the U.S. homeland, and a careful examination of how the available instruments of power might be best used to counter each specific threat. A review of the recent literature suggests that it would be possible to forge a rough consensus that Homeland Defense should be primarily concerned with the dangers posed to the United States by long-range missiles (particularly those systems capable of delivering CBRN to U.S. territory), terrorism (especially those groups that might prove capable of employing CBRN on U.S. territory), and attacks against critical infrastructure that would not only cause significant damage to U.S. economic interests, but might also increase U.S. vulnerability to other forms of attack and loss of life. Each of these threats pose complex conceptual, organizational, and resource problems to policymakers and practitioners engaged in the development of countermeasures. Taken together, the challenge is daunting indeed.
Missiles
In much of the literature on Homeland Defense, emphasis has been placed on the proliferation of long-range missile technology and its accessibility to "rogue states."
However, a comprehensive approach to Homeland Defense will necessarily include consideration of the threat posed by more traditional powers, for example Russia and China, as well. A strategy of deterrence will continue to require the maintenance of U.S.
strategic nuclear capabilities, a mission that clearly falls within established DOD responsibilities. Of course, maintenance of these capabilities carries resource
implications. At present levels this capability costs approximately 2 percent of the total DOD budget. Whether it will be possible to reduce expenditures further through arms negotiations or even a unilateral reduction of forces remains to be seen. Nonetheless, Stratcom's resource requirements will need to be given due attention for the foreseeable future.
U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities may also serve as a deterrent force against the so-called "rogue states". However, given the less than universal agreement regarding the efficacy of a "traditional" nuclear deterrent strategy against a North Korea or other actors that might threaten the U.S., a case can be made for development and deployment of a National Missile Defense system (NMD) as a key element of the "prevention" component of Homeland Defense. Here again, given that we are talking about a state actor using an offensive military weapon, it is appropriate, per established practice, to assign primary responsibility for this program to DOD. DOD has the established relationships with the private sector contractors and the methodologies in place to develop, test, and procure systems of this nature. And, of course, the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) is already fully engaged in this program. Nevertheless, the budget battles and technological issues that are sure to accompany this effort will undoubtedly put a strain on DOD.
The discussion of the missile threat against the U.S. homeland, however, cannot begin and end with the DOD piece. Neither U.S. nuclear strike capabilities, nor NMD will be sufficient to address all possible missile threats under all potential threat scenarios. Accordingly, deterrence and prevention require active engagement of the Intelligence Community in monitoring threats and tracking proliferation efforts being made by actual and potential adversaries. The diplomatic instrument can also play a critical role through the negotiation of international agreements in the disarmament and counter-proliferation areas. The economic and technological resources available to the U.S. and its allies also should be more aggressively applied in a concerted effort to prevent the proliferation not only of weapons, but also of the expertise required in the development of weapons programs. In other words, greater emphasis and resources should be devoted to programs such as those developed under the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Act.
In the event of a missile attack against U.S. territory, attribution and retaliation requirements will also necessarily involve the Intelligence Community and the Department of State, as well as DOD. These interagency connections, fortunately, are fairly well established. With the approval of the National Command Authorities and similar coordination processes, DOD might also be charged with conducting preemptive or retaliatory strikes using a variety of military capabilities, conventional and strategic.
Here the requirements of Homeland Defense do not replace current tasks for the U.S.
military, but they are related.
Terrorism
The Along these lines, when military forces are deployed domestically, not only do the issues at hand become more highly politicized, but the risk that excessive force will be utilized also increases dramatically. Military forces act as they have been trained to actthat is to say as soldiers, not as law enforcement officers. Consequently, when it comes to dealing with terrorism, especially terrorist threats on U.S. territory, law enforcement agencies should be given primacy. On the federal level, the FBI should ensure proper sharing of intelligence information, coordination with local authorities, and the lawful collection of the evidence necessary to proceed with prosecutions in the courts.
Turning specifically to the issue of how best to neutralize foreign terrorist groups that might be willing to take the necessary risks to conduct a successful attack on U.S.
territory, deterrence and prevention rely more upon good intelligence, cooperation and coordination with foreign partners, and effective law enforcement than on the direct application of military instrument. As Ambassador Sheehan has argued, the best defense is a good offense conducted abroad. 4 Knowledge of the goals and strategies of each individual group is key to the development of a successful counter-terrorism strategy.
Utilization of this intelligence, often in conjunction with foreign partners, can result in the denial of sanctuary to terrorists, restriction of their freedom of movement and access to the resources needed to develop WMD capabilities, and the elimination of terrorist support networks.
Air strikes against terrorist targets, such as at Al-Shiba, can contribute to the effort to deter terrorism. It can also be readily conceded that Special Operations Forces are a counter-terrorism capability that should be retained in the "tool box." However, U.S. intelligence services, law enforcement agencies, and even the Department of State, are better positioned than the military to run the programs needed to address, or at least manage, the terrorism threat at its roots.
As with the missile threat and NMD, since deterrence and prevention efforts abroad cannot absolutely ensure that no adversary will be able to conduct attacks on U.S.
territory, attention must be devoted to a second tier of prevention measures. The U.S.
border is notoriously porous and there is little question that an effective Homeland Defense strategy requires that this vulnerability be addressed. However, given the physical characteristics of the border and the strong U.S. interest in the freedom of commerce, it is clear that this will be no easy task. The volume of people, vehicles and cargo that flow across the borders and through U.S. ports of entry provides a favorable environment within which potential terrorists (as well as organized crime and drugtraffickers) can operate. No system of border control will prove to be 100 percent effective, but as Ikle has stated, a more robust border control system, i.e. more attention to the prevention piece of the problem, will also force prospective terrorists to undertake higher risk and higher profile entry operations that should prove to be more visible to intelligence collection mechanisms. 5 Along these lines, law enforcement agencies responsible for border control, whether they merge or not, must not only share intelligence obtained from their own operations, but should also develop stronger links to other sources of information, including Intelligence Community reporting.
Enhancing the capabilities of civilian law enforcement agencies responsible for border control would also have the important, albeit indirect, benefit of significantly diminishing the probability that the military will be implicated in incidents along the border. U.S. forces, such as Task However, in response to the reaction from the American public, a more measured approach to Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA) operations was adopted.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Hamre stressed that DOD would never seek any role other than as a supporting force to local law enforcement. 6 Secretary Cohen later acknowledged that DOD had been a bit "premature" in raising the issue of a need for a CINC. 7 The recent creation of a Joint Task Force for Civilian Support in order to facilitate DOD assistance to the consequence management piece of the Homeland Defense problem is, however, wholly consistent with the arguments made here.
Critical Infrastructure
When the discussion turns to protection of critical infrastructure, it becomes even more difficult to achieve the level of clarity that one would desire before attempting to recommend a strategy. However, when critical infrastructure is discussed in the In short, it will not be easy to develop a solution to the problem of how best to organize an effective defense of America's critical infrastructure. The prevention piece alone will require enhanced vertical coordination between all levels of government and a joint effort horizontally that includes the private sector. Barring a successful, dramatic attack on the infrastructure, this effort will require sustained attention over time. As noted above, the creation of a Directorate of Information Operations would at least give a home to such a program. The CSIS study recommended that the new administration retain the office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism within the National Security Council. This suggestion has merit in that continuity in the NSC's engagement in these issues should be maintained to ensure that the new policy team can quickly assess the state of play.
.
Conclusions
This discussion of Homeland Defense was intended to suggest that non-military instruments of power will not only be integral to the execution of a comprehensive strategy, but may also be more effective and appropriate instruments than the military depending upon the nature of the specific threat. Focused tasking and the utilization of all instruments of power, will reduce the opportunity costs and will allow the services and DOD to devote constrained resources (budgetary, manpower, and leadership) to areas where only the military can serve U.S. national security interests.
In the Homeland Defense context, the military clearly must play a leading role in the maintenance of a strategic nuclear deterrent and the development and deployment of a National Missile Defense system. DOD and the armed serves (primarily the National Guard) should also be tasked with a supporting role in consequence management and CND. In order to respond effectively to these requirements, DOD will need to take a fresh look at the organization of the joint staff (especially in the IO area which cuts across the responsibilities of all staffs), and devote sufficient resources to STRATCOM.
Providing assistance in the consequence management area will require adequate staffing and budget of JTF for Civil Support and the establishment of a new mission for the National Guard. This latter requirement will have to be factored into the force structure and war fighting plans. NMD will be a long-term effort requiring senior level attention to the imposing budgetary, technological, and manpower issues that go along with a project of this magnitude.
At the policy level, the NSC will have to play a stronger role ensuring that the contributions made by all federal agencies to the Homeland Defense effort are fully coordinated and maximized. The authors of the CSIS study have recommended that the Vice-President be made responsible for most aspects of Homeland Defense. A National Emergency Planning Council, chaired by the Vice-President, would be formed as a mechanism to bring together the heads of concerned agencies, as well as representatives of the private sector and state governments. This proposal has merit given that unity of effort may require this level of engagement by the administration in order to overcome turf battles and to obtain Congressional support New organizational structures, such as the NHSA should be carefully considered, but it should be recognized that the complexity of the issues involved will resist purely organizational solutions. A sustained and longterm effort across the board will be required to promote the evolution of a truly joint approach to the threats posed to the homeland.
In his comments on Homeland Defense, Ikle has stated that, "…American defense planners need to find a middle ground between wishful neglect and wasteful exaggeration." 9 A holistic approach to Homeland Security will contribute to the effort to find that middle ground.
